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ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT
POLICIES: TOWARD AN ERA OF ‘ENLIGHTENED’
POLICYMAKING?
Fernando Dias Simões*

Abstract
One of the sharpest ideological frictions that
characterises modern societies is the one that
opposes supporters and opponents of trade and
investment liberalisation policies. The existence of
mixed empirical findings underscores the
importance of avoiding general assertions about
the benefits of such policies. Policymaking
processes need to take into account the economic,
social, and environmental costs of trade and
investment policies. Evidence-based approaches
encourage governments to draw on scientific
knowledge and replace ideology with more rational
decision-making
mechanisms.
Sustainability
Impact Assessment studies, a sophisticated and
comprehensive tool designed by the European
Commission, marked a turning point in the way
international trade negotiations are conducted.
They allow for a discussion between a broad range
of stakeholders about a variety of societal concerns
that was not included in the traditional trade
agenda. However, there are many factors bearing
on the trade policymaking process besides
scientific knowledge. Policymaking is an
essentially political process that seeks to balance
competing interests. Impact assessment studies are
meant to inform the policymaking process, not to
replace political judgment. In the end, the influence
of trade impact assessment studies in the
formulation of new policies is in the hands of
negotiators and governments.

* Associate Professor, Chinese University of Hong Kong; PhD, University of Santiago de Compostela;
LLM, University of Glasgow; LLB, University of Coimbra.

1211

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

1

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 3

1212

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

I. A PERENNIAL CHASM
Over the last few decades policies for the promotion and protection of
free trade and foreign investment have been shaping the world economy
profoundly. Legal rules and principles have been put in place to govern
cross-border transactions with the stated purpose of conducing to
economic growth and social prosperity. Despite their sway on the
economic, political, and social fabric of modern societies, the
conformity of these policies with the laws of economics in not
universally accepted. The existence of a causal link between trade and
investment liberalisation policies and economic development has been
the object of ceaseless discussions both inside and outside academic
circles. While there are middle-ground, nuanced positions, participants
in this debate can be divided into two groups: those who are optimistic
about the contribution of free trade and investment policies for
economic development; and those who are sceptical. Both sides of the
dispute have been untiringly seeking for evidence to support their
claims.
As regards trade liberalisation, ‘optimists’ point to empirical evidence
demonstrating that these policies contribute significantly for economic
growth.1 From this perspective, free trade policies are an engine of
economic progress, even if in some cases they produce undesired sideeffects that need to be mitigated.2 Differently, ‘sceptics’ claim that there
is no sound empirical evidence on free trade as an instrument of
economic development.3 The fragility or sheer inexistence of a link
between trade liberalisation and economic improvement leads some to
characterise free trade policies as an ideology,4 a dogma,5 a faith,6 or
1. See, e.g., Tarlok Singh, Does International Trade Cause Economic Growth? A Survey, 33
THE WORLD ECON. 1517 (2010); David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Trade, Growth, and Poverty F22-F49
(World
Bank
Pol’y
Res.,
Working
Paper
No.
2615,
2001),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=632684; David Dollar & Robert H. Wade, Trade
Liberalization and Economic Growth: Does Trade Liberalization Contribute to Economic Prosperity?,
in CONTROVERSIES IN GLOBALIZATION: CONTENDING APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 139 (Peter M. Haas & John A. Hird eds., 2013); HENDRIK VAN DEN BERG & JOSHUA J. LEWER,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2007); DOUGLAS IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE
(4th ed. 2015).
2. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & ANDREW CHARLTON, FAIR TRADE FOR ALL: HOW TRADE CAN
PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT (2005); Arvind Panagariya, Miracles and Debacles: an Extension, in
HANDBOOK OF TRADE POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENT 417 (Arvid Lukauskas, Robert Stern & Gianni
Zanini eds., 2013).
3. See, e.g., Francisco Rodriguez & Dani Rodrik, Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A
Skeptic’s Guide to the Cross-National Evidence, 15 NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH 261 (2001);
EMMA SAMMAN, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, OPENNESS AND GROWTH: AN EMPIRICAL
Investigation’,INVESTIGATION (2005); IAN FLETCHER, FREE TRADE DOESN’T WORK: WHAT SHOULD
REPLACE IT AND WHY (2nd ed. 2011).
4. Robert Benson, Free Trade as an Extremist Ideology: The Case of NAFTA, 17 U. OF PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 555 (1994); LEONARD GOMES, THE ECONOMICS AND IDEOLOGY OF FREE TRADE: A
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even a myth7.
The existence of a causal relationship between foreign investment and
economic development is also hotly debated. A number of scholars
argue that policies for the promotion and protection of foreign direct
investment can stimulate investment flows8 and contribute considerably
to the host country’s economic progress9. Contrarily, some
commentators argue that the available empirical evidence does not
suggest a significant association between these policies and investment
flows10 or economic growth.11
HISTORICAL REVIEW (2003); CRAIG BERRY, GLOBALISATION AND IDEOLOGY IN BRITAIN:
NEOLIBERALISM, FREE TRADE AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2011). See also KENNETH R. HOOVER,
ECONOMICS AS IDEOLOGY: KEYNES, LASKI, HAYEK, AND THE CREATION OF CONTEMPORARY POLITICS
(2003).
5. Inge Ropke, Trade, Development, and Sustainability – a Critical Assessment of the Free
Trade Dogma, 9 ECOLOGICAL EconomicsECON. 13 (1994).
6. G. BRUCE DOERN & BRIAN W. TOMLIN, FAITH AND FEAR: THE FREE TRADE STORY (1992);
Margaret Atwood, Blind Faith and Free Trade, in THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE: GATT, NAFTA,
AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE POWER 92 ( Ralph Nader ed.,1993).
7. RAVI BATRA, THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE: A PLAN FOR AMERICA’S ECONOMIC REVIVAL
(1993); RAVI BATRA, THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE: THE POORING OF AMERICA (1996); GRAHAM
DUNKLEY, FREE TRADE: MYTH, REALITIES AND ALTERNATIVES (2004); SHERROD BROWN, MYTHS OF
FREE TRADE: WHY AMERICAN TRADE POLICY HAS FAILED (2006); GLOBALIZATION AND THE MYTHS
OF FREE TRADE: HISTORY, THEORY, AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 2007 (Anwar Shaikh ed., 2006); HAJOON CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS: THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE AND THE SECRET HISTORY OF
CAPITALISM (2008).
8. See Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign
Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1567 (2005); Matthias Busse, Jens
Königer & Peter Nunnenkamp, FDI Promotion Through Bilateral Investment Treaties: More than a Bit,
146 REV. OF WORLD ECON. 147 (2010); Jennifer L. Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, When BITs have
Some Bite: The Political-economic Environment for Bilateral Investment Treaties, 6 REV. OF INT’L
ORG. 1 (2011).
9. See, e.g., EDWARD GRAHAM, FIGHTING THE WRONG ENEMY: ANTIGLOBAL ACTIVISTS AND
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2000); FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (H.S. Kehal
ed., 2004); THEODORE H. MORAN ET AL., DOES FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT?
(2005); THEODORE H. MORAN, HARNESSING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT:
POLICIES FOR DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2006); ANTHONY BENDE-NABENDE,
GLOBALISATION, FDI, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2002).
10. See, e.g., Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct
Investment? Only a Bit… and They Could Bite, World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 3121, at 19
(2003), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/113541468761706209/pdf/multi0page.pdf; Jason
Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from
Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2011); Henrik Hansen & John Rand, On the Causal Links
Between FDI and Growth in Developing Countries, (World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Res., Research Paper
No. 2005/31, 2005); Abdur Chowdhury & George Mavrotas, FDI and Growth: What Causes What?, 29
THE WORLD ECO. 9 (2006); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Role of
International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries
(2009); THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs
eds., 2009); Manuchehr Irandoust, A Survey of Recent Developments in the Literature of FDI-Led
Growth Hypothesis, 11 THE J. OF WORLD INV. & TRADE 275 (2010); Axel Berger et al., Do Trade and
Investment Agreements Lead to More FDI? Accounting for Key Provisions Inside the Black Box, (Kiel
Inst. for the World Econ., Working Paper No. 1647, 2010).
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The assumption that there is a correlation between trade and
investment liberalisation and economic growth has come under attack
on its theoretical and empirical foundations. Ha-Joon Chang claims that
the postulation that free trade is the key to global progress is an
imagined history with no correspondence to reality.12 Liberalisation
policies are seen as part of a political agenda aimed at expanding the
profits of multinational corporations.13 After the suspension of the Doha
Development Round negotiations, Carin Smaller stated emphatically:
The contradictions between the promised benefits at the global
level and the empirical evidence on the ground are harder and
harder to explain. People around the world are aware of how the
liberalization of trade and finance is affecting their daily lives and
are refusing to accept the current approach . . . WTO members can
no longer pretend that this new evidence does not exist. We know a
lot more than we did 10 years ago when the WTO began.14
Since there are also mixed opinions about the advantages of
investment liberalisation, it is surprising that states conclude
international investment agreements so often.15 The reason for this
apparently unfounded behaviour may be that states feel compelled to
demonstrate that they offer an investor-friendly environment through the
conclusion of investment treaties.16 Trade and investment liberalisation
policies seem to be decided and implemented based on theoretical
11. See Liesbeth Colen, Miet Maertens & Johan Swinnen, Foreign Direct Investment as an
Engine for Economic Growth and Human Development: A Review of the Arguments and Empirical
Evidence, in FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 70 (Olivier De Schutter et al. eds., 2013); Liesbeth
Colen, Miet Maertens & Johan Swinnen, Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Flows to
Developing Countries: the Role of International Investment Agreements, in FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS 116 (Olivier De Schutter et al. eds., 2013); Amrita Chaudhuri & Hassan Benchekroun,
The Costs and Benefits of IIAs to Developing Countries: an Economic Perspective, in IMPROVING
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 93 (Armand de Mestral & Céline Lévesque eds., 2013).
12. Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: The “Real” History of Free Trade, in
GLOBALIZATION AND THE MYTHS OF FREE TRADE: HISTORY, THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 23,
23 (Anwar Shaikh ed., 2007).
13. Robin Broad, Introduction, in GLOBAL BACKLASH: CITIZEN INITIATIVES FOR A JUST WORLD
ECONOMY 13, 17 (Robin Broad ed., 2002).
14. See WTO Talks Breakdown – Opportunity for a New Approach, THE INST. FOR AGRIC. AND
TRADE POL’Y, https://archive.commondreams.org/scriptfiles/news2006/0724-11.htm (last visited March
1, 2018).
15. Marie-Claire Segger & Andrew Newcombe, An Integrated Agenda for Sustainable
Development in International Investment Law, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT
LAW 99, 116 (Marie-Claire Cordonier-Segger et al. eds., 2011).
16. Id. at 117. See also Andrew Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining
the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. OF INT’L LAW 639 (1998).
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assumptions that are not unequivocally supported by evidence.
Discussing the eventual ratification of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA) by Australia, Senator Scott Ludlam observed:
For something such as this, it is not enough to simply proceed on
some kind of blind ideological faith that all forms of trade
agreement are uniformly good for all people in all countries, and
that was the proposition that seemed to be advanced . . . with
nothing to back it by way of formal or quantitative evidence.17
Also apropos the ACTA, Australian scholar Rimmer argued:

The secretive origins of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement 2011 highlights the need for greater transparency
and information-sharing about treaty negotiations; the necessity
of democratic participation in policy formulation and
development; and the demand for evidence-based policy making
informed by independent, critical research on the economic,
social, and political costs of treaties.18
According to Van Harten,19 the absence of clear evidence or of
contradictory finding also brings about the need to rethink whether it
makes sense to accord foreign investors the benefits of the investor-state
dispute settlement mechanism.
While trade and investment policies have always been contentious,
currently it can be said that they are under fire. In an age of accelerated
globalisation, International Economic Law is at the centre of political
and academic debates. The existence of inconclusive or mixed evidence
underscores the importance of avoiding general assertions about the
benefits of current laws and policies. The profound chasm between
optimists and sceptics can only be attenuated through a reanalysis of
theoretical assumptions and an unbiased reassessment of empirical
findings. This exercise is vital to ensure that trade and investment
policies, more than making sense on paper, do in fact work in a real life
context. If it is concluded that trade and investment policies fail to
17. Scott Ludlam, Speech on the ACTA Report of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties
(June 27, 2012), https://greensmps.org.au/articles/speech-acta-report-joint-standing-committee-treaties
18. Matthew Rimmer, A Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 (#ACTA), QUEENSLAND U. OF TECH. 1, 69 (2012). Rimmer
added: “[I]t is disturbing that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 has been driven by
ideology and faith, rather than by any evidence-based policy making.” Id. at 6.
19. Gus Van Harten, Reforming the System of International Investment Dispute Settlement, in,
ALTERNATIVE VISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT. ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH 103, 110 (C.L. Lim ed., 2016).
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achieve their stated purpose – promoting economic growth, creating
jobs, and increasing the overall welfare of citizens – it is necessary to
reconsider them and contemplate other alternatives.
II. MOVING FROM BELIEF TO REASON
Laws and policies on trade and investment liberalisation have a
profound impact at the national and global level and cannot be based on
erroneous theoretical assumptions or – even worse – conviction, wishful
thinking, or faith. Commentators have been emphasising the need to
adopt policymaking procedures that incorporate sound, reliable
information on the real economic and social benefits and costs of
policies.20 Current knowledge about the effects of trade and investment
policies is incomplete and imprecise. It is necessary to avoid ‘leaps of
faith’ by putting greater emphasis on quantitative and qualitative studies
that provide a thorough knowledge about the real-life effects of policies.
This rational approach would allow to design new policies that take into
due account the relative advantages and drawbacks of trade and
investment policies and reshape them when they do not yield the
intended effects.21 It would also allow for the management of the diverse
expectations of different stakeholders and the reduction of discontent
with the regime.22 The idea is to move the debate from ideological
differences to a more rational appraisal of the competing arguments.23
This approach argues that governments and policymakers need to pay
more attention to robust, methodologically accurate empirical evidence.
The decision-making process should be evidence-based, that is, it should
be informed by an empirical assessment of the likely consequences of
proposed policies.24 The ex ante appraisal of trade proposals offers
objective information that negotiators can incorporate into the
discussion in order to address societal concerns.25 Furthermore, the ex
20. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Managing Expectations: Beyond Formal Adjudication, in
PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY: WORLD TRADE FORUM 371, 372
(Roberto Echandi & Pierre Sauvé eds., 2013); Matthew Rimmer, Trick or Treaty? The Australian
Debate over the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), in ACTA AND THE PLURILATERAL
ENFORCEMENT AGENDA: GENESIS AND AFTERMATH 1, 18-19 (Pedro Roffe and Xavier Seuba eds.,
2014) ; Directorate General for Internal Policies Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy,
EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 578.992, 51 (2016).
21. Franck, supra note 20, at 372; Directorate General for Internal Policies Policy Department A:
Economic and Scientific Policy, supra note 20, at 51.
22. Franck, supra note 20, at 371.
23. Clive George, Tomasz Iwanow & Colin Kirkpatrick, Sustainability Impact Assessments
Applied to Regional Integration, in THE REGIONAL INTEGRATION MANUAL: QUANTITATIVE AND
QUALITATIVE METHODS 247, 247 (Philippe De Lombaerde et al. eds., 2011).
24. Id.
25. See Clive George & Colin Kirkpatrick, Trade and Development: Assessing the Impact of
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post assessment of policies can provide policymakers and governments
with valuable information on the actual effectiveness of measures.26
In this day and age, ‘evidence-based policymaking’ is a
buzzword27 frequently articulated by academics and policymakers. It
is also commonplace in the media vocabulary.28 Even though it may
seem self-explanatory,29 its definition is – like any good catchphrase
– quite elusive. Rather elliptically, evidence-based policymaking
denotes that policymaking should be based on or determined by
scientifically rigorous evidence.30 More precisely, the concept refers
to the systematic appraisal of different forms of empirical research to
be incorporated into the policymaking process.31 In the words of
Philip Davies, evidence-based policymaking is an approach that
“helps people make well informed decisions about policies,
programmes and projects by putting the best available evidence from
research at the heart of policy development and implementation”.32
This movement represents an ‘anti-ideological turn’ in policymaking
by claiming that interventions should be grounded on empirical
evidence of effectiveness instead of political beliefs.33
The historical roots of this approach can be found in the ‘evidencebased medicine’ movement that developed since the 1980s.34 The
underlying argument of this theory is that research studies show that
many common medical interventions are ineffective or even
damaging to patients. As a result, practitioners should only
implement treatments whose effectiveness has been evidenced in
suitable clinical tests.35 Some authors go even farther, claiming that
Trade Liberalisation on Sustainable Development 34-35, (Inst. for Dev. Pol’y and Mgmt., IARC
Working Paper No. 5, 2004).
26. George, Iwanow & Kirkpatrick, supra note 23.
27. Brian Head, Reconsidering Evidence-based Policy: Key Issues and Challenges, 29 POL’Y
AND SOC’Y 77, 78 (2010).
28. PAUL CAIRNEY, THE POLITICS OF EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY MAKING 1 (2016).
29. Greg Marston & Rob Watts, Tampering With the Evidence: A Critical Appraisal of
Evidence-Based Policy-Making, 3 THE DRAWING BOARD: AN AUSTL. REV. OF PUB. AFF. 143, 144
(2003).
30. Carolyn Heinrich, Evidence-Based Policy and Performance Management: Challenges and
Prospects in Two Parallel Movements, 37 AM. REV. OF PUB. ADMIN. 255, 255 (2007).
31. Marston & Watts, supra note 29; MARK BEVIR, KEY CONCEPTS IN GOVERNANCE 82 (2009);
John Hoornbeek, Evidence-based Policy, in 1 INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POL. SCI. 860, 860 (Bertrand
Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser & Leonardo Morlino eds., 2011).
32. Philip Davies, Address at the Campbell Collaboration Colloquium: Is Evidence-Based
Government
Possible?
(2004),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.545.364&rep=rep1&type=pdf, at 3.
33. RAY PAWSON, EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY: A REALIST PERSPECTIVE 2 (2006).
34. Hoornbeek, supra note 31, at 861; DAVID BYRNE, APPLYING SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE ROLE OF
SOCIAL RESEARCH IN POLITICS, POLICY AND PRACTICE 43 (2011) .
35. Bevir, supra note 31, at 82; MARTYN HAMMERSLEY, THE MYTH OF RESEARCH-BASED
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the evidence-based policymaking movement is a re-affirmation of the
principle, which underpinned the 18th century ‘Age of
Enlightenment’, according to which public policies should be based
on reason.36
The last few decades witnessed growing interest in the
development and use of ‘evidence-based policymaking’ in a wide
range of public policy areas such as criminal justice, education, the
environment, housing, or social welfare.37 Evidence-based
approaches also became increasingly common regarding the creation
and implementation of legal rules.38 The Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) has been advocating the use
of evidence-based policymaking to achieve the Millennium
Development Goals.39 The United Nations also considers evidencebased decision-making processes crucial for the development
agenda.40 In the European Union (“EU”), evidence-based rulemaking
is presented as an essential part of the European Commission’s drive
for ‘Better Regulation’.41 Key legislative proposals and cross-cutting
policy proposals undergo an integrated impact assessment.42 These
POLICY AND PRACTICE 1, 2 (2013). See also David Sackett et al., Evidence Based Medicine: What it is
and What it Isn’t, 312 BRITISH MED. J. 71, 71 (1996).
36. Hoornbeek, supra note 31, at 860; Ian Sanderson, Making Sense of ‘What Works’: Evidence
Based Policy Making as Instrumental Rationality?, 17 PUB. POL’Y AND ADMIN. 61, 61 (2002); Michael
Heazle, John Kane & Haig Patapan, Good Public Policy: on the Interaction of Political and Expert
Authority, in POLICY LEGITIMACY, SCIENCE AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY: KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION IN
LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 1, 8 (Michael Heazle & John Kane eds., 2016).
37. See STEPHEN BOCKING, NATURE’S EXPERTS: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
21 (2004); Adrian Cherney & Brian Head, Evidence-Based Policy and Practice: Key Challenges for
Improvement, 45 AUSTL. J. OF SOC. ISSUES 509, 510 (2010); Sandra M. Nutley, Isabel Walter & Huw
T.O. Davies, USING EVIDENCE: HOW RESEARCH CAN INFORM PUBLIC SERVICES (2007); Ian Shemilt et
al. eds., EVIDENCE-BASED DECISIONS AND ECONOMICS: HEALTH CARE, SOCIAL WELFARE, EDUCATION
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2d ed. 2010).
38. See, e.g., J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and EvidenceBased Sentencing, 64 S.M.U. L. REV. 1329 (2011); Bernard Trujillo, Patterns in a Complex System: an
Empirical Study of Valuation in Business Bankruptcy Cases, 53 UCLA L. REV. 356 (2005); Timothy
Stoltzfus Jost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix it: An Essay on Health Law and Policy,
41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 537 (2006); Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal
Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093 (2009).
39. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, BEYOND THE
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: TOWARDS AN OECD CONTRIBUTION TO THE POST-2015 AGENDA,
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/broaderprogress/pdf/POST-2015%20Overview%20Paper%20(OECD).pdf.
40. Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Affairs of the UN Secretariat, The Millennium Development Goals
Report
2015
(2015),
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20(July%201).pd
f.
41. See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the European Council and the Council: Better Regulation: Delivering Better Results for a
Stronger Union, COM (2016) 615 final (Sept. 14, 2016).
42. See ANNE CLAARTJE MARGREET MEUWESE, IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN EU LAWMAKING
(2008).
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studies are seen as an instrument to address the lack of evidencebased decision-making processes in the development of policy
proposals.43
Just like evidence-based medicine, evidence-based policymaking
seeks to address a perceived gap between evidence and practice. The
idea is that policymakers do not understand or sometimes even ignore
the existent evidence.44 In order to address this problem, this
approach seeks to modernise and rationalise the policymaking
process.45 The use of the best available evidence can increase the
quality of the process of policy development, implementation, and
evaluation.46 By making use of ‘scientific’ or ‘scholarly’ knowledge,
policymakers can learn from previous successes and failures and
choose the most rational, effective policies.47 Policymakers are seen
as neutral “managers” who identify a problem and find the most
effective way of addressing it.48 This appeal to rationality explains
the popularity of the evidence-based policymaking movement,
endowing it with an aura of scientific authority.49
The concept of evidence-based policymaking has an intuitive,
common sense logic,50 some say even a ‘bewitching’ effect.51 Most
people would agree that policies ought to be planned according to the
best available information.52 There should be a direct, clear link
between the existent evidence and policy choices.53 The
policymaking process needs to be designed in a way that enables the
incorporation of the best data so as to identify rational alternatives
and outcomes. This rational approach will illuminate the decisionmaking process, steering it from opinions and beliefs to sound,
reliable evidence. Scientific knowledge should be put at the service

43. Id. at 3.
44. CAIRNEY, supra note 28.
45. Marston & Watts, supra note 29, at 144-145; Heazle, Kane & Patapan, supra note 36, at 2;
Paul Burton, Wicked, Diabolical or What? Responding Rationally in a Turbulent Environment, in
RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: LESSONS FROM AN AUSTRALIAN HOTSPOT 5, 7 (Paul Burton ed.,
2014); Michael Howlett & Sarah Giest, The Policy-making Process, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC POLICY 17, 20 (Eduardo Araral Jr. et al. eds., 2013); Sue Mayer, Using Evidence in Advocacy, in
RESEARCH SKILLS FOR POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT: HOW TO FIND OUT FAST 254, 254 (Alan Thomas &
Giles Mohan eds., 2007).
46. Head, supra note 27, at 77.
47. Marston & Watts, supra note 29, at 144-145.
48. Howlett & Giest, supra note 45, at 20.
49. Bevir, supra note 31, at 82.
50. Marston & Watts, supra note 29, at 144.
51. CAIRNEY, supra note 28, at 2.
52. Id.; Marston & Watts, supra note 29, at 144; Mayer, supra note 45, at 254.
53. CAIRNEY, supra note 28, at 2.
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of the policymaking process.54
III. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICIES

‘Evidence-based’ has become the new credo55 or mantra56 in the
area of policymaking. The popularity of this approach has also
stretched into the trade and investment realm. In the late 1990s,
governments and international organisations started carrying out
impact assessment studies to soothe civil society’s apprehension
about the negative consequences of trade liberalisation.57 In the
context of the World Trade Organisation, trade impact assessment
studies emerged for the first time in the run-up to the 1999 ministerial
conference in Seattle.58 Similar studies were conducted by the
European Commission’s Directorate-General for Trade for the Doha
Development Round negotiations.59 The public protests than
engulfed the Seattle meeting and the debacle of the negotiations for a
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) persuaded the
Commission to conduct impact assessment studies of all new
measures proposed in international trade negotiations.60 There now
54. Hoornbeek, supra note 31, at 861.
55. Directorate-General for Research, European Commission, Report of the Expert Group of
Science and Governance to Science, Economy and Society Directorate: Taking European Knowledge
Society Seriously, 1, 77, EUR 22700 (2007).
56. Cherney & Head, supra note 37, at 2.
57. Clive George, Rachid Nafti & Johanna Curran, Capacity Building for Trade Impact
Assessment: Lessons from the Development of Environmental Impact Assessment, 19 IMPACT
ASSESSMENT AND PROJECT APPRAISAL 311, 311 (2001); Colin Kirkpatrick & Clive George, Assessing
the Sustainability of Trade Policies and Agreements, in CONDUCTING SUSTAINABILITY ASSESSMENTS
119, 120 (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development ed., 2008); Clive George & Colin
Kirkpatrick, Sustainability Impact Assessment of Trade Agreements: From Public Dialogue to
International Governance, 10 J. OF ENVTL. ASSESSMENT POL’Y & MGMT 67, 68 (2008); Lisa Alf et al.,
Towards a Transatlantic Dialog on Trade and the Environment: A Comparison of Approaches to
Environmental Impact Assessments of Trade Agreements in the US and EU, at 1, 45 (Apr. 2008),
http://ecologic.eu/sites/files/event/2013/transatlantic-lunch-jan-08-final_report.pdf.
58. Paul Ekins & Tancrède Voituriez, Overview and General Introduction, in TRADE,
GLOBALIZATION AND SUSTAINABILITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: A CRITICAL LOOK AT METHODS AND
OUTCOMES 1, 1 (Paul Ekins & Tancrède Voituriez eds., 2009); Clive George & Colin Kirkpatrick,
Creation of Processes: Sustainability Impact Assessments, in THE POLITICS OF TRADE: THE ROLE OF
RESEARCH IN TRADE POLICY AND NEGOTIATION 55, 55-56 (Diana Tussie ed., 2009); Markus Gehring,
Sean Stephenson & Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Sustainability Impact Assessments as Inputs and as
Interpretative Aids in International Investment Law, 18 J. OF WORLD INV. & TRADE 163, 168 (2017).
59. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, HANDBOOK FOR TRADE SUSTAINABILITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT
(2d ed., 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/april/tradoc_154464.PDF.
60. Thomas F. Ruddy & Lorenz M. Hilty, Impact Assessment and Policy Learning in the
European Commission, 28 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 90, 94 (2008); Colin Kirkpatrick & Clive
George, Methodological Issues in the Impact Assessment of Trade Policy: Experience from the
European Commission’s Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) Programme, 24 IMPACT ASSESSMENT
& PROJECT APPRAISAL 325, 325 (2006); Gehring, Stephenson & Cordonier Segger, supra note 58.
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seems to be a consensus that policymaking in the area of trade
agreements should start and end with impact assessment.61 Over the
last years, several international organisations such as the United
Nations,62 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development,63 and the Asian Development Bank64 have been
conducting this type of studies.
We are living in the ‘age of assessment.’65 The propagation of
impact assessment studies signals a shift towards an ‘evidence-based’
approach to trade policymaking66 and is a reflexion of the so-called
‘knowledge society.’67 These studies are now a well-established
instrument to inform trade negotiators and policymakers and steer
their decision-making processes.68 Quantitative and qualitative data
on the relationship between proposed trade policies and their
potential effects is collected in a scientific fashion.69 The goal is to
calculate the probable positive or negative consequences of a
selection of alternative measures.70 This information may contribute
to adjust existing policies, generate new ones, or change the way

61. MICHAEL PLUMMER, DAVID CHEONG & SHINTARO HAMANAKA, METHODOLOGY FOR
IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 1, 1 (2010).
62. See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, REFERENCE MANUAL FOR THE
INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF TRADE-RELATED POLICIES (2001).
63. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Guidance on Sustainability
Impact Assessment, (2010), https://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/46530443.pdf;
Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Conducting Sustainability Assessments (2008); ibid,),
http://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/download/9708071e.pdf?expires=1520015023&id=id&accname=ocid43008851&
checksum=FA45BC96D8E953EFA3113C68E8F5855A; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Assessing the Environmental Effects of Trade Liberalisation Agreements:
Methodologies’Methodologies
(2000),,http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/assessing-theenvironmental-effects-of-trade-liberalisation-agreements_9789264180659-en.
64. See Asian Development Bank, How to Design, Negotiate, and Implement a Free Trade
Agreement in Asia (2008), https://aric.adb.org/pdf/fta_manual.pdf.
65. Steve Rayner, Democracy in the Age of Assessment: Reflections on the Roles of Expertise
and Democracy in the Public-sector Decision Making, 30 SCI. AND PUB. POL’Y 163, 163 (2003).
66. Kirkpatrick & George, supra note 57, at 124.
67. Matthew Cashmore & Lone Kornov, The Changing Theory of Impact Assessment, in
SUSTAINABILITY ASSESSMENT: PLURALISM, PRACTICE AND PROGRESS 18, 18 (Alan Bond, Angus
Morrison-Saunders & Richard Howitt eds., 2013).
68. George, Iwanow & Kirkpatrick, supra note 23; Stephen White & Jakub Koniecki, How
Informed Should Decisions Be?, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, EVALUATION AND POLICY-MAKING:
THEORY, PRACTISE AND QUALITY ASSURANCE 129, 129 (Anneke von Raggamby & Frieder Rubik eds.,
2012); Alf et al., supra note 57, at 1.
69. Kirkpatrick & George, supra note 57; George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 58.
70. Tom Bauler, The Commission’s Impact Assessment Process: Handling the External
Dimensions of Sustainability, in, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: INTERNAL
AND EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS 277, 278 (Marc Pallemaerts & Albena Azmanova eds., 2006).
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problems are identified and policies are formulated.71 This helps to
rationalise and even facilitate the negotiating process by maximising
the benefits and reducing the potential drawbacks of trade policies.72
Furthermore, trade impact assessment studies also inform the
general public about the potential effects of projected policies by
including mechanisms for public participation and consultation.73
Public participation is a key element of the process.74 Consultation
with stakeholders and experts can shed light on relevant issues that
are frequently overlooked during negotiations.75 The involvement of
other agencies or departments may also add expertise in specific
areas, particularly in relation to the environmental and social
dimensions of trade policies.76 This open, participatory debate about
the consequences of international agreements might help
policymakers to integrate societal concerns such as sustainable
development more fully into trade policies.77
Since trade impact assessment studies have been developed by
different actors – national governments, international organisations,
and non-governmental organisations – with diverse scopes and under
different designations, there is no single methodology for conducting
them.78 Within the European Union, these studies are known as
Sustainability Impact Assessment (“SIA”).
The European Commission describes SIA as follows:79
71. See J. Ivan Scrase & William R. Sheate, Integration and Integrated Approaches to
Assessment: What do they Mean for the Environment?, 4 J. OF ENVTL. POL’Y & PLAN. 275, 275 (2002).
72. George, Nafti & Curran, supra note 57, at 312; Ekins & Voituriez, supra note 58, at 9.
73. Kirkpatrick & George, supra note 57, at 120; George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 57, at 69;
Gerald Berger, Sustainability Impact Assessment: European Approaches, in CONDUCTING
SUSTAINABILITY ASSESSMENTS 15, 19 (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development ed.,
2008).
74. Markus Gehring & Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Overcoming Obstacles with
Opportunities: Trade and Investment Agreements for Sustainable Development, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: BRIDGING THE GAP 93, 103 (Stephan Schill, Christian Tams &
Rainer Hofmann eds., 2015).
75. Id.
76. Gehring, Stephenson & Cordonier Segger, supra note 58, at 175.
77. George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 58, at 58; Kirkpatrick & George, supra note 57;
Kirkpatrick & George, supra note 60, at 327; Clive George & Bernice Goldsmith, Impact Assessment of
Trade-related Policies and Agreements: Experience and Challenges, 24 IMPACT ASSESSMENT &
PROJECT APPRAISAL 254, 254 (2006); See also Hussein Abaza & Robert Hamwey, Integrated
Assessment as a Tool for Achieving Sustainable Trade Policies, 21 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV.
481 (2001).
78. George, Iwanow & Kirkpatrick, supra note 23.
79. European
Commission,
Sustainability
Impact
Assessments,
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/policy-making/analysis/policy-evaluation/sustainability-impactassessments/index_en.htm (last visited February 25, 2017); See also EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra
note 59, at 5 (“SIAs are independent ex ante assessments carried out by external consultants during
major trade negotiations. They feed into and steer the negotiations, assessing the changes that are likely
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The Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) is a DG Tradespecific tool for supporting major trade negotiations. SIAs
provide the Commission with an in-depth analysis of the
potential economic, social, human rights, and environmental
impacts of ongoing trade negotiations.
These assessments are an opportunity for stakeholders in both
the EU and in the partner countries to share their views with
negotiators.
SIAs have several purposes, including:
• feeding information into and helping steer the
negotiations
• assessing the changes that are likely to be caused by a
trade agreement
• helping to identify possible trade-offs
• ensuring that the related policy choices are optimized.
SIAs contribute to sound, evidence-based and transparent trade
negotiations.
The European Commission has been carrying out SIAs on all trade
agreements negotiated since 1999. By the end of 2016, 25 SIAs had
been conducted in support of bilateral and multilateral trade
negotiations, and three were ongoing.80 SIAs complement the initial
impact assessment conducted by the Commission before negotiations
are launched.81 Despite the use of the word ‘sustainability’, SIAs go
beyond the mere assessment of environmental impact, also gauging
the economic, social, and human rights consequences of trade
agreements.82 Furthermore, these studies calculate the effect of trade
agreements no only in the European Union, but also in the partner
country and in developing countries,83 thus making a significant
contribution to regional and global governance.84 In the words of the
Commission: 85

to be caused by the trade agreement, helping to identify possible trade-offs, and ensuring that the related
policy choices are optimised.”).
80. European Commission, supra note 79. A list of all completed and ongoing SIAs can be
accessed at the same webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/policy-making/analysis/sustainabilityimpact-assessments/.
81. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 59, at 7.
82. Kirkpatrick & George, supra note 60, at 325.
83. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 59, at 5.
84. Kirkpatrick & George, supra note 60, at 325.
85. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 59, at 5-6.
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SIAs consist of two equally important and complementary
components:
(i) a robust analysis of the potential economic, social, human
rights and environmental impacts that the trade agreement under
negotiation could have, in the EU, in the partner country(ies) and
in other relevant countries;
(ii) a continuous and wide-ranging consultation process which
ensures a high degree of transparency and the engagement of all
relevant stakeholders in the conduct of the SIA inside and outside
the EU.

In April 2016 the Commission published the second edition of its
Handbook for Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment.86 The new
edition seeks to incorporate a range of lessons drawn from the
Commission’s experience and the requests of stakeholders.87 As
regards the scope of SIAs, since 2012 they also include an
assessment of the potential human rights consequences of trade
agreements.88 The second edition of the handbook also emphasises
the importance of transparency:
Transparency is a central element of SIAs. By relying on a
genuine, wide-ranging and continuous consultation of
stakeholders, SIAs contribute to fulfilling the Commission’s
commitment to ensure transparent trade negotiations. They are a
prime opportunity for stakeholders to inform EU negotiators of
their views on the potential economic, social, human rights and
environmental consequences of ongoing trade negotiations.89
Furthermore, SIAs are an important tool for integrating sustainable
development concerns into the trade policymaking process by measuring
the effects and mitigating the tensions between trade and investment
policies, climate change, and other sustainable development issues.90
The European Commission states:
[T]he European Union is committed to stepping up efforts to see
that international trade and investment are used as a tool to achieve

86. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 59. The first edition of the Handbook was published in
2006 – see EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Handbook for Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/march/tradoc_127974.pdf (last visited February 24, 2017).
87. Foreword by Commissioner Malmström, in EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 59, at 3.
88. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 59, at 5.
89. Id.
90. Gehring, Stephenson & Cordonier Segger, supra note 58, at 164.
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genuine global sustainable development. SIAs contribute to this
objective by assessing in depth the potential economic, social and
environmental impacts of a proposed trade agreement whilst its
negotiation is ongoing; as well as by providing recommendations
on the accompanying measures that should be put in place (if a
deal is agreed and implemented) in order to maximise likely
benefits or mitigate possible negative impacts. SIAs also provide
the opportunity for an analysis of the impact of the trade agreement
on developing countries, in line with commitments stemming from
the EU treaties on policy coherence for development, and
particularly in relation to least developed countries . . . .91
In summary, the European Commission claims that SIAs are inspired
by six key principles. SIAs are said to be:92
• Integrated: SIAs are based on a comprehensive approach
which looks at both benefits and costs; and covers economic,
social, human rights and environmental considerations all in a
single document.
• Independent: SIAs are carried out by external consultants in a
neutral and unbiased manner, under strict rules on the absence of
conflicts of interest.
• Evidence-based: SIAs should be based on the best available
research, information and data presented in a transparent manner.
• Transparent: SIAs contribute to the transparency of the
analysis and of the ongoing trade negotiations by providing
stakeholders with comprehensive information on the possible
impacts of the agreement.
• Participatory: SIAs work as a platform for systematic dialogue
between stakeholders and trade negotiators, through in-depth
consultation in which all stakeholders are given an opportunity to
participate.
• Proportionate: The scope and the depth of each SIA should be
calibrated to the importance and the type of trade measures being
negotiated, as well as to the magnitude of the expected impacts.
The trade SIA programme signals an effort by the European
Commission to adopt a new policymaking process that incorporates the
best available evidence in a systematic way.93 By analysing the
expectable impact of policies, SIAs provide important inputs into the
91. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 59, at 5 (footnotes omitted).
92. Id. at 6.
93. Kirkpatrick & George, supra note 57, at 129.
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negotiation process on the nexus between trade, investment,
environment, social and human rights.94 The focus on the distributive
effects of trade policies endows SIAs with an all-inclusive approach that
is necessary to achieve such a complex, multifaceted goal as sustainable
development.95 In the handbook it is recognised that ‘SIAs must provide
analysis in more dimensions and based on more evidence than was
foreseen ten years ago.’96 The SIA model also allows the European
Commission to adopt a more holistic perspective on the policymaking
process by simultaneously pursuing diverse goals: ‘evidence-based
policymaking’, ‘better governance’, ‘sustainable development’, and the
need to ‘act globally.’97
Trade impact assessment studies have been conducted for almost two
decades. This consolidated practice suggests an attempt to move trade
and investment policies towards a less ideological, more rational age.
The recurrent backlash against trade and investment liberalisation calls
for the use of reliable, sound evidence in policy development and
implementation. Well informed, transparent decision-making processes
may improve the quality of measures and outcomes. The hope is that
these studies help to bridge the gap between “knowledge producers”
(academics, program evaluators, policy analysts) and “knowledge
consumers” (negotiators and policymakers).98
What is more, the debate between ‘optimists’ and ‘sceptics’ goes
beyond academic and political circles and reaches the community at
large through media outlets.99 Since they are the final addressees (and
potential beneficiaries) of policies, trade impact assessment studies need
to take into account the concerns of citizens regarding the interplay
between trade liberalisation and sustainable development in a
transparent and participatory manner.100 The Commission’s handbook
94. Gehring, Stephenson & Cordonier Segger, supra note 58, at 165. The authors add that,
besides their function as an input to the negotiating process, SIAs may also be relevant as interpretative
tools. SIAs and the position papers issued by the European Commission in response may arguably be
regarded as part of a treaty’s travaux préparatoires or the circumstances of its conclusion pursuant to
article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties. Id. at 189.
95. Paul Ekins & Tancréde Voituriez, Conclusion, in, TRADE, GLOBALIZATION AND
SUSTAINABILITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: A CRITICAL LOOK AT METHODS AND OUTCOMES 331, 334 (Paul
Ekins & Tancréde Voituriez eds., 2009).
96. Foreword by Commissioner Malmström, supra note 59, at 3.
97. Clive George & Colin Kirkpatrick, Sustainability Impact Assessment of World Trade
Negotiations: Current Practice and Lessons for Further Development 2-3, (Impact Assessment
Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 2, 2003), https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/idpmia/30587.html.
98. KAREN BOGENSCHNEIDER & THOMAS J. CORBETT, EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING:
INSIGHTS FROM POLICY-MINDED RESEARCHERS AND RESEARCH-MINDED POLICYMAKERS 2 (2010).
99. For a recent example, see Andrew Walker, Is Free Trade Good or Bad?, BBC NEWS
(January 18, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-38209407.
100. Ruddy & Hilty, supra note 60, at 102. See PARTICIPATION FOR SUSTAINABILITY IN TRADE
(Sophie Thoyer & Benoît Martimort-Asso eds., 2007).
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also underlines the importance of “close dialogue with all relevant
stakeholders, including the more vulnerable ones” in order to “capture
the wider implications of our policy choices and to prevent unintended
side-effects. With this prevention-driven approach, we can ensure that
our trade policy genuinely works for all.”101
IV. TOWARD AN ERA OF ‘ENLIGHTENED’ TRADE POLICY?

Impact assessment studies are a key instrument in the formulation
of sound, transparent, evidence-based trade and investment
policies.102 In abstract, they allow to ‘enlighten’ the policymaking
process by rendering it more rational, thus achieving better,
scientifically tested outcomes. However, they are faced with serious
obstacles. While some of those difficulties are common to any
evidence-based approach, others result from the particular nature of
international trade negotiations.
A. General limitations of the evidence-based approach

Like other approaches that seek to make the policymaking process
more rational, evidence-based policymaking faces several challenges.
First, as the name denotes, evidence-based policymaking is centred on
evidence. However, the concept of evidence is vague 103 and
contentious104. Different types of ‘evidence’ can enter into the
policymaking process since there are multiple sources of information
and varied ways of assessing it.105 Not all “evidence is equal, nor
equally robust.”106 There are no clear rules on how evidence should be
evaluated nor instructions on how it should be used in different policy
fields.107 Furthermore, the qualification of information as ‘evidence’ is
not a neutral, objective judgement, but the result of a decision made by
someone in a particular context, for a specific purpose.108 This
assessment is not a purely technical exercise, as personal assumptions
101. Foreword by Commissioner Malmström, supra note 59, at 3.
102. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 59, at 5.
103. Bevir, supra note 31, at 82-83.
104. Marston & Watts, supra note 29, at 145.
105. Bevir, supra note 31, at 82-83; Eileen Munro, Evidence-Based Policy, in PHILOSOPHY OF
SOCIAL SCIENCE: A NEW INTRODUCTION 48, 51-52 (Nancy Cartwright & Eleonora Montuschi eds.,
2014); James Meadowcroft & Reinhard Steurer, Assessment Practices in the Policy and Politics Cycles:
A Contribution to Reflexive Governance for Sustainable Development?, J. OF ENVTL. POL’Y AND PLAN.
1, 5 (2014).
106. Marston & Watts, supra note 29, at 157.
107. Bevir, supra note 31, at 82-83.
108. Munro, supra note 105, at 51.
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and value judgements are normally involved.109 The product of scientific
research is only treated as evidence when someone decides that it will
support a certain claim.110 As a result, evidence underpinning evidencebased policymaking processes cannot be considered absolutely
neutral.111
Second, policymakers may find it difficult to sort out the ‘best’
evidence from all the available information since, like policymakers,
scientists often disagree.112 Policymakers may also be generalist
individuals who lack the necessary expertise to understand the
intricacies of the information before them. As a result, they may rely
more on the perception of those providing them with evidence than on
the evidence itself.113
Third, policymakers face time constraints. Sound, reliable research
requires significant amounts of time, which may not be compatible with
policy cycles that require prompt responses. Policymakers are frequently
required to address both perceived emergencies and ambitious policy
agendas.114 They may decide not to wait for the results of research.115
Fourth, evidence-based approaches to policymaking do not seem
to have the same traction in all fields. While they appear to work well
in the area of natural sciences,116 it seems difficult to implement the
same model regarding social phenomena117. Policymakers require a
higher degree of certainty when mulling measures that generate
strong opposition.118 Evidence-based approaches seem to be less
effective when issues are contentious.119 In such cases arguments
tend do become politicised,120 with parties arguing that research
findings are biased and lack objectivity.121 Different factions engage

109. Marston & Watts, supra note 29, at 157; Richard Tarasofsky, Report on the Workshop
Methodologies for Environmental Assessment of Trade Liberalisation Agreements, in ASSESSING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALISATION AGREEMENTS: METHODOLOGIES 11, 12 (OECD,
2000).
110. Marston & Watts, supra note 29, at 157.
111. Id.
112. Hoornbeek, supra note 31, at 862.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Marston & Watts, supra note 29, at 146.
116. Bevir, supra note 31, at 84.
117. Munro, supra note 105, at 58.
118. Michael Heazle, Rationality under Uncertainty: Why Politics Matters, in RESPONDING TO
CLIMATE CHANGE: LESSONS FROM AN AUSTRALIAN HOTSPOT 15, 19 (Paul Burton ed., 2014).
119. Brian Head, Evidence-based Policy-making for Innovation, in HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION
IN PUBLIC SERVICES 143,153 (Stephen Osborne & Louise Brown eds., 2013).
120. Id. at 145; Head, supra note 27, at 81.
121. Head, supra note 27, at 81.
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in a debate about who has the ‘real science’122, leading to the
‘scientization’ of controversies.123
Finally, commentators have expressed serious reservations about the
possibility of effectively incorporating scientific evidence into
policymaking processes given the deep interconnection between
policymaking and politics. In the field of policymaking, science cannot
be totally separated from politics.124 Sarewitz talked about the ‘myth of
authoritativeness’, arguing that it is an illusion to think that science can
offer a ‘rational’ solution to political debates.125 Quite ironically, there is
little evidence of the impact of evidence in policymaking processes.126
While vast amounts of money are invested in policy analysis, its results
do not seem to be used by policymakers to make better decisions.127 Just
because information, data, or even sound ‘evidence’ has been brought to
light, one should not automatically assume that it will be endorsed or
implemented by policymakers. Policymakers and political leaders are
often influenced by many other factors besides scientific findings.128
Value judgements, political preferences and assumptions all play a role
in most policymaking processes.129 Additionally, policymakers may not
be neutral or competent to assess the available evidence.130 Like
everyone else, policymakers and politicians are subject to cognitive
biases.131 The policymaking process is thus marked by bounded
rationality.132
Furthermore, political leaders are permanently worried about
maintaining support from their allies and the general public, responding
to questions from the media and managing political risks.133 Policy
choices have to pass the technical challenge (will they work?) but also
122. MICHAEL HEAZLE, UNCERTAINTY IN POLICY MAKING: VALUES AND EVIDENCE IN COMPLEX
DECISIONS 72 (2010).
123. Daniel Sarewitz, How Science Makes Environmental Controversies Worse, 7 ENVT’L SCI. &
POL’Y 385, 399 (2004).
124. See, e.g., SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICYMAKERS
(1990).
125. DANIEL SAREWITZ, FRONTIERS OF ILLUSION: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF
PROGRESS 85 (1996).
126. BOGENSCHNEIDER & CORBETT, supra note 98, at 27.
127. See Nancy Shulock, The Paradox of Policy Analysis: If it is Not Used, Why do we Produce
so Much of it?, 18 J. OF POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 226 (1999).
128. Head, supra note 27, at 80; Head, supra note 119, at 144.
129. Mayer, supra note 45, at 254; Munro, supra note 105, at 59; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
USING SCIENCE AS EVIDENCE IN PUBLIC POLICY 14-15 (2012).
130. Howlett & Giest, supra note 45, at 20.
131. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
132. Sandra Nutley & Jeff Webb, Evidence and the Policy Process, in WHAT WORKS? EVIDENCEBASED POLICY AND PRACTICE IN PUBLIC SERVICES 13, 35 (Huw T.O. Davies, Sandra M. Nutley & Peter
C. Smith eds., 2000).
133. Head, supra note 27, at 80; Head, supra note 119, at 144.
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the legitimacy challenge (will they be supported)?134 In policy fields
with a higher public impact like the economy, the second question
becomes dominant.135 Policymaking is an essentially political process
that seeks to balance competing interests.136 This exercise of bargaining
and negotiation often outweighs ‘rational’ considerations.137 In the
words of Gary Banks, policy typically results from a “maelstrom of
political energy, vested interests and lobbying.”138 In the end, the
policymaking process seems to be more about persuasion and support
than about scientific validity.139
Policymakers attach great value to research because it plays a
fundamental role not only in policy formulation but also in political
argumentation.140 Scientific knowledge performs a legitimising function,
endowing governments with ‘epistemic authority’141 and thus enhancing
their legitimacy.142 The perception that governments make use of
reliable, relevant knowledge creates confidence that their decisions are
rational.143 Furthermore, expert knowledge can lend authority to certain
policy positions, helping to validate an organisation or political party’s
preferences while undermining others.144 This way of using evidence is
especially relevant in highly contested policy fields.145
While the evidence-based movement suggests a ‘rational’
approach to the policymaking process, this ideal of a ‘knowledge
society’ is detached from the real word.146 In 2014, Anne Glover,
then the European Union’s Chief Scientific Adviser, said that one of
the major challenges faced by the European Commission was to
disconnect its evidence gathering processes from the ‘political
134. Gerry Stoker & Mark Evans, Crafting Public Policy: Choosing the Right Social Science
Method, in EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY MAKING IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: METHODS THAT MATTER 29,
36 (Gerry Stoker & Mark Evans eds., 2016).
135. Id.
136. Meadowcroft & Steurer, supra note 105, at 11; Clive George & Colin Kirkpatrick, Political
Challenges in Policy-Level Evaluation for Sustainable Development: The Case of Trade Policy, in
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, EVALUATION AND POLICY-MAKING: THEORY, PRACTISE AND QUALITY
ASSURANCE 73, 73 (Anneke von Raggamby & Frieder Rubik eds., 2012).
137. Howlett & Giest, supra note 45, at 20.
138. GARY BANKS, EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY MAKING: WHAT IS IT? HOW DO WE GET IT? 7
(2009).
139. Brian Head, Three Lenses of Evidence-Based Policy, 67 AUSTL. J. OF PUB. ADMIN. 1, 5
(2008).
140. CHRISTINA BOSWELL, THE POLITICAL USES OF EXPERT KNOWLEDGE: IMMIGRATION POLICY
AND SOCIAL RESEARCH 7 (2009).
141. RAYMOND GEUSS, HISTORY AND ILLUSION IN POLITICS 38 (2001).
142. BOSWELL, supra note 140, at 7.
143. Id.
144. Nutley, Walter & Davies, supra note 37, at 39.
145. BOSWELL, , supra note 140, at 7.
146. Meadowcroft & Steurer, supra note 105, at 4.
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imperative’ driving policy proposals.147 According to Glover,
consultancy companies requested by the Commission to conduct
independent scientific studies have little incentive to produce
evidence that contradicts the Commission’s political agenda because
they want to attract more business.148
The instrumental use of scientific knowledge creates a risk that
evidence-based approaches are used by governments and policymakers
to legitimise their political and ideological preferences.149 Science may
be used as a rhetorical tool to create the illusion that the policymaking
process has been depoliticised.150 This may result in a shift from
evidence-based policy (the rational development of policies on the basis
of evidence) to policy-based evidence – the selective use of research to
demonstrate that policies have worked, continue to work, and will work
in the future.151 Policymakers may engage in cherry-picking, using
evidence when it supports their political preferences but otherwise
ignoring it.152 Researchers might be subject to attempts to politicise or
silence objective scientific research.153 Policymakers and politicians
might also try to act as “policy elites," increasing their control over what
constitutes knowledge and undervaluing other forms of information and
the voices of ordinary citizens.154 Political debates might escalate into a
battle between different policy proposals all claiming to be
‘scientifically’ and ‘rationally’ based.155
B. Trade negotiations: between bounded rationality and scientific
legitimacy
International trade and investment agreements are the result of a
bargaining process between two or more parties, each of which puts
forward an initial position, open to negotiation. This is an intrinsically

147. Frédéric Simon, EU Twisting Facts to Fit Political Agenda, Chief Scientist Says,
EURACTIVE, (May 27, 2014), http://www.euractiv.com/section/science-policymaking/news/eu-twistingfacts-to-fit-political-agenda-chief-scientist-says/.
148. Id.
149. See YARON EZRAHI, THE DESCENT OF ICARUS 14, 17 (1990).
150. Emma Clarence, Technocracy Reinvented: The New Evidence Based Policy Movement, 17
Public PolicyPUB. POL’Y & ADMIN. 1, 4 (2002) ; Sandra Nutley, Isabel Walter and Huw Davies, Past,
Present, and Possible Futures for Evidence-based Policy, in EVIDENCE FOR POLICY AND DECISIONMAKING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (1, 21 (George Argyrous ed.,, 2009).
151. BYRNE, supra note 34, at 5. 99
152. Clarence, supra note 150, at 5.
153. See Linda Rosenstock & Lore Jackson Lee, Attacks on Science: The Risks to Evidence-Based
Policy, 92 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 14, 14 (2002).
154. Marston & Watts, supra note 29, at 158.
155. Heazle, supra note 118.
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political process.156 Trade policies are by nature distributive since they
define who benefits and loses with the government’s intervention in the
market.157 Vested interests are at the heart of the process.158 Trade
policymaking is almost inexorably skewed since certain interests may
triumph over others and even the national interest.159
Robert Putnam160 described international trade negotiations as part of
a ‘two-level game’ composed of an international level and a domestic
level. In the international dimension, negotiations involve a broad
assortment of actors, including national governments, corporations, nongovernmental organisations, and consumer groups. All of these entities
pursue different interests and seek to influence not only on the outcome
of the negotiations but also the way they are conducted.161 Negotiators,
as agents for national principals, strive to achieve an outcome in line
with the national preference.162 In the domestic dimension, organised
lobby groups, such as political parties, business corporations, trade
unions, non-governmental organisations, and local and regional
governments, exert strong influence on national governments in an
attempt to steer its trade policy.163 Different stakeholders, pursuing
varying interests, all seek to influence the national negotiating position.
Negotiators in international trade negotiations make decisions based
on imperfect information – they are limited by their bounded
rationality.164 They do not know all of the circumstances surrounding the
156. Diana Tussie, The Politics of Trade: The Role of Research in Trade Policy and Negotiations,
in THE POLITICS OF TRADE: THE ROLE OF RESEARCH IN TRADE POLICY AND NEGOTIATION 1, 3 (Diana
Tussie ed., 2009),.
157. Diana Tussie & Pablo Heidrich, The Research Challenge in the Context of Permanent
Negotiations, in RESEARCH AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY NEGOTIATIONS: KNOWLEDGE AND
POWER IN LATIN AMERICA 21, 37 (Mercedes Botto ed., 2010); William A. Kerr, Introduction to Trade
Policy, in HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY 1, 1 (William A. Kerr & James D. Gaisford
eds., 2007).
158. Kerr, supra note 157, at 1.
159. James Gaisford & Annette Hester, Why are There Trade Agreements?, in HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY 57, 66 (William Kerr & James Gaisford eds., 2007).
160. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games, 42
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 427 (1988). See also DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL
BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson & Robert D. Putnam
eds.,1993).
161. Alice Landau, Analyzing International Economic Negotiations: Towards a Synthesis of
Approaches, 5 International NegotiationINT’L NEGOT. 1, 4 (2000).
162. Stephen Woolcock, Factors Shaping Economic Diplomacy: An Analytical Toolkit, in THE
NEW ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: DECISION-MAKING AND NEGOTIATION IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 17, 22 (Nicholas Bayne & Stephen Woolcock eds., 3rd ed. 2011).
163. TUSSIE, supra note 156; BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE WTO AND BEYOND 638 (Oxf. Univ. Press, 3d ed.
2009); Tancréde Voituriez et al., Making Trade Sustainable Impact Assessment more Relevant to Trade
Negotiations, 24 IMPACT ASSESSMENT & PROJECT APPRAISAL 335, 336 (2006).
164. WOOLCOCK, supra note 162; John Odell, Introduction, in NEGOT. TRADE: DEV. COUNTRIES
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negotiations, inter alia, the future evolution of markets or what deals the
other party might be willing to accept.165 Science cannot foresee such
complex scenarios with certainty. As a result, negotiators estimate
consequences and put rough values on alternative lines of conduct.166
Furthermore, negotiators, like all mortals, are subject to common
judgement biases that affect the value they place on alternative options
and how they respond to negative feedback.167 The ideas, values or
worldviews of negotiators can have significant bearing, especially in
situations of uncertainty or when judgement calls have to be made,
which is often the case.168
Trade and investment negotiations are surrounded by controversy.
Policies are frequently accused of lacking legitimacy because their
contribution to economic and social development is not supported by
sound, undisputed empirical evidence. This is reflected, for instance, in
the ongoing debate about a seeming legitimacy crisis of international
investment law.169 Much of this criticism is associated with the increase
in the number of cases submitted to investment arbitration and the
controversial nature of some awards rendered in high-profile cases.
Several commentators even cast a shadow of doubt about the legitimacy
of the international investment law system.170
The evidence-based approach to policymaking is attractive for
governments because policies need to seem rational in order to have
legitimacy.171 Researchers derive their legitimacy from their
commitment to rationality.172 However, while researchers engage in a
systematic endeavour to understand natural and social phenomena,
policymakers are more concerned with finding practical responses for
public policy issues.173 Hence, scientific knowledge may play two
different roles in the formulation of trade policies. First, it can sustain a
state’s demand in a trade negotiation. Second, it can operate as a
IN THE WTO & NAFTA

9 (John Odell ed., (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006).),
165. JOHN ODELL, NEGOTIATING THE WORLD ECONOMY 19 (Cornell Univ. Press, 2000).
166. Id.
167. Id, at 3.
168. WOOLCOCK, supra note 162, at 24-25.
169. STEPHAN SCHILL, CHRISTIAN TAMS & RAINER HOFMANN, International Investment Law and
Development: Friends or Foes?, in INT’T. INV. L. & DEV.: BRIDGING THE GAP 27 (in Stephan Schill,
Christian Tams & Rainer Hofmann eds., 2015).
170. STEPHAN SCHILL, International Investment Law as International Development Law, in
YEARBOOK ON INT’L. INV. L. & POL’Y. 2012-2013 345 (Andrea Bjorklund ed, (2014); ),See also
Charles Brower & Stephan Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International
Investment Law? 9 CHI. J. OF INT’L L. 471, 471 (2009).
171. HEAZLE, supra note 122, at 4.
172. HEAZLE, KANE & PATAPAN, supra note 36, at 2.
173. See Nathan Caplan, The Two-Communities Theory and Knowledge Utilization, 22 AM.
BEHAVIORAL SCI 459, 459 (1979).
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legitimising tool.174 While the first dimension shapes a country’s
negotiating agenda, the second legitimises the implementation of a trade
agenda that is the result of several other forces, often of a political
nature.175 Evidence-based policymaking runs the risk of being used
merely as a maquillage of legitimacy to disguise contested political
options. Instead of rationalising and informing the policymaking
process, research may be used to support prior positions.176
Within the European Union there are two types of studies concerning
the impact of trade policies: trade SIAs and Impact Assessments (IAs).
IAs are prepared by Commission services in accordance with the
Commission’s guidelines and tools. They accompany the decision by the
College of Commissioners to request a negotiating authorisation from
the Council of the European Union, together with the draft negotiating
directives to be issued by the latter.177 Once the Commission receives
the negotiating mandate, a trade SIA is launched. Therefore, while the
IA is performed before the negotiating mandate is granted, and
examines whether action should be taken; the trade SIA is undertaken
after the negotiation process has been launched, discussing how action
should be taken and what its likely consequences are.178 Another
difference is that while SIAs are independent assessments carried out by
external consultants, 179 with the Commission commenting on their
findings via so-called ‘position papers;’180 the IA is undertaken by
Commission services181 – even though most of the evidence used in the
assessment is often drawn from external studies.182 Finally, whereas
trade SIAs are conducted for all major trade negotiations by the
European Union, IAs are less frequent. Still, IAs seem to have become
more common over the last years.183
As a rule, IAs allow for public consultation and full public access to
174. TUSSIE, supra note 156, at 6.
175. Id.
176. BOGENSCHNEIDER & CORBETT, supra note 98, at 2.
177. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 59, at 7.
178. Jaques Pelkmans et al., EU_US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Detailed
Appraisal of the European Commission’s Impact Assessment, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH
SERVICE
8-9
(Apr.
2014),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/528798/
IPOL-JOIN_ET (2014)528798_EN.pdf; Jacques Pelkmans et al., The Impact of TTIP: The Underlying
Economic Model and Comparisons, CENTRE FOR EUR. POL’Y. STUDIES 7 (Oct. 2014)
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/No%2093%20Appraisal%20of%20IA%20on%20TTIP.pdf.
179. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 59, at 5, 6 & 9.
180. Pelkmans et al., Detailed Appraisal, supra note 178, at 9 n.10.
181. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 59, at 7.
182. Pelkmans et al., Detailed Appraisal, supra note 178, at 9, n.10; Pelkmans et al., The Impact
of TTIP, supra note 178, at 7 n.9.
183. Pelkmans et al., Detailed Appraisal, supra note 178, at 9.
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assessment reports.184 However, this is not always the case in the field of
trade: assessments are conducted internally and access to the reports is
generally restricted.185 Pursuant to the European Commission’s
guidelines, the Secretariat General’s Impact Assessment Unit publishes
the final IA report and the executive summary on the Europa IA website
along with the proposal and the Impact Assessment Board’s opinion.
However, in certain cases, such as when information is confidential and
sensitive, a decision to restrict or delay the publication may be
considered.186
At a first glimpse, the restriction of public access to the IA seems
justified. If the European Union’s negotiating position was disclosed
publicly, this could weaken the position of negotiators.187 However,
there is a side-effect to confidentiality: the negotiating mandate is not
based on an impact assessment conducted publicly.188 Differently from
other IAs that involve public consultation and full public access to
assessment reports, trade IAs are normally kept confidential. This seems
to break the link between the evidence-base provided by the IA and the
negotiating directive proposal, calling into question, to a certain extent,
the utility of the IA beyond the closed-circle of individuals with access
to the draft mandate.189 The trade SIA that follows the IA analyses the
development of a policy that has already been approved by the Council
of the European Union – the launch of negotiations for a new trade
agreement. As a result, it is a tool for evaluating how a pre-decided
action should be taken.190 Although the publicly conducted SIA process
is intended to inform negotiating positions, it does not define them.191
There is therefore the risk that the trade SIA is used merely to support
a predisposition to promote trade liberalisation policies. The European
Commission’s Directorate-General for Trade’s posture has been

184. George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 58, at 62.
185. Id.
186. European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines 11 (2009), http://ec.europa.eu/smartregulation/impact/commission_guidelines/docs/iag_2009_en.pdf.
187. Kirkpatrick & George, supra note 60, at 331; George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 136, at 78;
George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 57, at 71; George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 58, at 63; Colin
Kirkpatrick & Clive George, The Influence of the European Union’s Sustainability Impact Assessment
on Multilateral and Regional Trade Negotiations, IMPACT ASSESSMENT RES. CENTRE 18,
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.530.5253&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
188. George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 57, at 71; ELISABETH B. BONANOMI, SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW MAKING AND TRADE: INTERNATIONAL FOOD GOVERNANCE
AND TRADE IN AGRICULTURE 93 (Edward Elgar, 2015).
189. Pelkmans et al., Detailed Appraisal, supra note 178, at 10.
190. Ruddy & Hilty, supra note 60, at 91.
191. Kirkpatrick & George, supra note 60, at 331; George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 58, at 63;
Kirkpatrick & George, supra note 187, at 18.
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characterised by some as supporting the free trade ideology192 and
placing free trade over sustainable development193. It has been argued
that the SIA framework ‘is built on the assumption that growth will be
promoted by multilateral trade liberalisation and that this is desirable.
As such, a pro-liberalisation bias is built into the analysis from the start
limiting consideration of alternative scenarios such as no-further trade
liberalisation or trade in a different form.’194 Thus, some civil society
organisations see SIAs as a ‘superfluous bureaucratic exercise’.195
The two forms of impact assessment used by the European
Commission to evaluate trade policies are not incompatible with each
other. Whereas IAs contribute to the development of a negotiating
mandate, SIAs allows for broader public dialogue which may influence
the application of that mandate.196 Integrating the two impact assessment
studies could have some benefits but would require the development of
rules striking a balance between the confidentiality needed to protect the
Union’s negotiating position and the transparency necessary to make a
meaningful contribution to the public debate.197 While the degree of
public participation and consultation during the preparation of trade IAs
does not seem sufficient, it should be noted that the European
Commission has been allowing for public access to the most recent trade
IA reports – namely the one regarding the TTIP198 – differently from
what happened in the past.199
C. Influence of impact assessment studies on the outcome of trade
negotiations
Given the challenges posed to the efficiency of evidence-based
192. OLE ELGSTRÖM & JESS PILEGAARD, Imposed Coherence: Negotiating Economic Partnership
Agreements, in 49, POL’Y. COHERENCE & EU DEV. POL’Y 49 (Maurizio Carbone ed., (Abingdon, 2009);
OLE ELGSTRÖM, Partnership in Peril? Images and Strategies in EU-ACP Economic Partnership
Agreement Negotiations, in EXTERNAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE EUR. UNION AS A GLOBAL ACTOR 137149, 144 (Sonia Lucarelli & Lorenzo Fioramonti eds., (2010).
193. BEN ROSAMOND, THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 120 (Neill Nugent et al. eds.,
2000); Simon Lightfoot & Jon Burchell, The European Union and the World Summit on Sustainable
Development: Normative Power Europe in Action?, 43 J. OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES 75, 83
(2005).),
194. Sarah Richardson, A “Critique” of the EU’s WTO Sustainability Impact Assessment Study
and Recommendations for Phase III, Oxfam GB, WWF-European Policy Office, Save the Children,
ActionAid 1, 2 (2000), http://www.fern.org/sites/fern.org/files/pubs/reports/tradesia.htm
195. See Ruddy & Hilty, supra note 60, at 94.
196. George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 57, at 85.
197. Id.
198. See European Commission, Impact Assessment Report on the future of EU-US trade
relations,
SWD(2013)68
final
1,
8-9,
(2013),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150759.pdf.
199. George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 136, at 78.
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policymaking in general and the political intricacies of trade negotiation
processes in particular, the key question becomes: do trade impact
assessment studies shed any light over the potential pros and cons of
trade and investment liberalisation policies? And if so, do they produce
any visible influence on the outcome of the negotiation process?
One should start by acknowledging the highly technical nature of
trade policies and negotiations.200 This complexity is further augmented
by the fact that trade policies increasingly encompass a diverse range of
domestic and international issues including intellectual property rights,
competition policy, labour rights, investment protection, and
government procurement.201 Furthermore, impact assessment is by
nature complex. Any impact assessment study involves highly technical
analysis concerning a wide array of sectors, stakeholders, and economic,
social, and political settings that are very difficult to measure. Impact
assessment of trade policies presents further challenges, given the range
of variables and the international nature of associated decision-making
processes.202 In many areas these studies can only identify impacts
which may occur at a significant level, rather than making firm
predictions.203 They therefore provide an imperfect, approximate prevue
of the potential impact of a trade agreement.204 However, if policies are
to be based upon evidence, there is no alternative but to work with
estimates.205
Efforts should be implemented to address technical shortcomings so
that impact assessment studies can yield a more trustworthy forecast into
potential the effects of trade policy proposals.206 Still, even if impact
trade assessments were technically fine-tuned to almost perfection, they
would not replace political judgement.207 Political decisions always

200. Tussie & Heidrich, supra note 157, at 21; HARRY JONES ET AL., KNOWLEDGE, POLICY AND
POWER IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 109 (The Overseas Development
Institute, 2012).
201. See NIGEL GRIMWADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY: A CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS 237
(Routledge, 1996); William Miner, Modern History of Trade Policy, in HANDBOOK ON INT’L. TRADE
POL’Y. 38-39 (William Kerr & James Gaisford eds., 2007).
202. BONANOMI, supra note 188, at 90; Joost Kessler & Hussein Abaza, United Nations
Environment Programme’s Approach to Integrated Assessment of Trade-related Policies: Evolution and
Recent Progress, 24 IMPACT ASSESSMENT & PROJECT APPRAISAL 273, 274-275 (2006).
203. George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 97, at 27.
204. BONANOMI, supra note 188, at 94; Samantha Velluti, The Promotion and Integration of
Human Rights in EU External Trade Relations, 32 UTRECHT J. OF INT’L & EUROPEAN L. 41, 58 (2016).
205. BONANOMI, supra note 188, at 89.
206. See TRADE, GLOBALIZATION AND SUSTAINABILITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: A CRITICAL LOOK
AT METHODS AND OUTCOMES (Paul Ekins & Tancrede Voituriez eds., 2009).
207. Berger, supra note 73, at 20; White & Koniecki, supra note 68; MARIALUISA TAMBORRA,
Impact Assessment and Sustainability, in APPLIED RES. IN ENV. ECONOMICS 72 (Christoph Böhringer &
Andreas Lange eds., 2005).
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involve value judgements that go beyond technical analysis.208 In the
words of the European Commission:
Impact assessment is an aid to decision-making, not a substitute for
political judgement. Indeed, political judgement involves complex
considerations that are go far beyond the anticipated impacts of a
proposal. An impact assessment will not necessarily generate
clearcut conclusions or recommendations. It does, however,
provide an important input by informing decision-makers of the
consequences of policy choices.209
Trade SIAs are now firmly established as a standard policy tool
within the European Union. Still, the fact is that they are not
mandatory.210 While this type of studies is mentioned in several
documents,211 none of them establishes an obligation for the
Commission to conduct SIAs for trade agreements. In fact, they are
mere political declarations of intent.212 The European Commission’s
communication on impact assessment213 is a mere policy guideline. As a
result, SIAs are conducted mainly on the basis of a political
commitment.214 The lack of a legally binding framework for SIAs
entails a degree of uncertainty regarding the scope, implementation, and
follow-up of these studies.215
The influence of trade impact assessment studies on the outcome of
the policymaking process generates mixed opinions. Again, there are
optimists and sceptics.
Some authors start by recalling that the adoption by the European
Commission of trade SIAs was a strategic political decision aimed at
reducing civil society opposition to trade liberalisation policies.216 From
this perspective, it can be argued that SIAs have a positive impact since
they engage civil society in a process of consultation and dialogue,
thereby contributing to a greater consideration by the Commission of the

208. BONANOMI, supra note 188, at 90, 94.
209. European Commission, Communication from the Commission on Impact Assessment,
COM(2002) 276 final 3 (2002).
210. Alf et al., supra note 57, at 6; Gehring, Stephenson & Cordonier Segger, supra note 58, at
171.
211. See, among others, European Commission, supra note 186; European Commission, supra
note 209.
212. Alf et al., supra note 57, at 3.
213. European Commission, supra note 209.
214. Gehring, Stephenson & Cordonier Segger, supra note 58, at 169.
215. Id.
216. George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 136, at 84-85.
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impact of trade policies.217 The Commission comments on the findings
of these studies through ‘position papers’ defining points of agreement,
responding to disagreements, and considering further actions to be
implemented.218 Civil society groups and parliamentarians in both the
European Union and its partner countries also make use of the findings
of SIAs in their submissions to governments, thus seeking to influence
the negotiation process.219 These studies are also receiving increasing
attention from the European Parliament.220 By offering opportunities for
greater transparency and public dialogue, these studies help to build
capacity and increase cooperation, thus enhancing the credibility and
legitimacy of trade and investment agreements.221
Other commentators are less optimistic, expressing doubts about any
meaningful impact of SIAs on the trade negotiating process.222 The
European Commission is not bound by the results of impact assessment
studies.223 While the Commission responds to the findings and
recommendations of SIAs, some commentators regard them as
inadequate, criticising the lack of a mechanism to challenge the
Commission’s responses.224 Even if these studies recommend measures
to mitigate the negative impact of proposed policies, there is no
guarantee that they will be implemented.225 There seems to be a
dissonance between the impact assessment findings and the decisionmaking process. Trade SIAs have failed to deliver on the expectation
that they would facilitate the process of deal-making by bringing more
evidence to the negotiating table which negotiators could use to balance
217. Id.
218. Clive George, Tomasz Iwanow & Colin Kirkpatrick, EU Trade Strategy and Regionalism:
Assessing the Impact on Europe’s Developing Country Partners, in THE EU AND WORLD
REGIONALISM: THE MAKABILITY OF REGIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 74-75 (Philippe De Lombaerde &
Michael Schulz eds. 2016).
219. Id. at 84.
220. Id. at 75.
221. Rok Zvelc, Environmental Integration in EU Trade Policy: the Generalised System of
Preferences, Trade Sustainability Impact Assessments and Free Trade Agreements, in THE EXTERNAL
ENV. POL’Y. OF THE EUR. UNION: EU & INT’L. L. PERSPECTIVES 191 (Elisa Morgera ed., 2012).
222. Ekins & Voituriez, supra note 58, at 9; Ekins & Voituriez, supra note 95, at 334-335; Clive
George, Regional Trade Agreements and the Environment: Monitoring Implementation and Assessing
Impacts: Report on the OECD Workshop, OECD Trade & Environment Working Papers, 2011/02, 11
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/regional-trade-agreements-and-the-environment_5kgcf7154tmqen.http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/regional-trade-agreements-and-the-environment_5kgcf7154tmqen.
223. Fabiane Baxewanos & Werner Raza, Human Rights Impact Assessments as a New Tool for
Development
Policy?,
AUSTRIAN
FOUND.
FOR
DEV.
RES.
1,
11,
https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/98807.
224. Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droit de l’Homme, Human Rights Impact
Assessments of Trade and Investment Agreements concluded by the European Union. Position Paper, at
12, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/positionpaperFIDH-HRIA_finalfevrier2008.pdf.
225. Baxewanos & Raza, supra note 223, at 12.
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the benefits and the drawbacks of trade liberalisation.226
Similarly to what happens with other types of impact assessment
studies, the implementation of trade SIAs is difficult since they are
conducted in the context of a markedly political decision.227 Impact
assessment studies in general have been criticised for focusing on
justifying the Commission’s proposals.228 Many European
Commission officials believe that most impact assessment studies are
carried out in order to justify a policy choice already made.229 Instead
of being used by trade negotiators to develop and implement
sustainable policies, trade SIA studies may simply provide an
appearance of legitimacy that justifies pre-existing trade
negotiations.230 From this perspective, trade SIAs are not designed to
restrain the negotiation mandate but to secure public consent.231
Authors have expressed doubts about the Commission’s
willingness to modify its negotiating position when faced with an
SIA with very negative findings.232 One of the reasons for the
apparent low relevance of trade SIAs is that they have a markedly
different nature from negotiation processes. While the former are
conducted publicly, assess impact on both the European Union and
affected countries and are supposed to be impartial; the latter are
confidential and principally reflect the European Union’s economic
interests.233 This leads to inconsistencies between SIA
recommendations and EU negotiating positions.234 The Commission
is only willing to modify its negotiating position if it ‘considers the
result [of the SIA] to be robust, otherwise it may not’.235 While trade
SIAs raise public awareness about the potential impact of trade
negotiations, thus far they have failed to cause significant changes in

226. Ekins & Voituriez, supra note 58, at 9.
227. Hernán Blanco, Sustainability Impact Assessment of Trade Policy and its Application in the
Context of Latin America, 24(4) IMPACT ASSESSMENT & PROJECT APPRAISAL 285, 286 (2006).
228. The Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the Commission’s Impact Assessment System, 6.
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/key_docs/docs/tep_eias_final_report.pdf.
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/key_docs/docs/tep_eias_final_report.pdf
229. Id. at 5.
230. Baxewanos & Raza, supra note 223, at 12.
231. Id.
232. Jacquie True, Trading-Off Gender Equality for Global Europe? The European Union and
Free Trade Agreements, 14 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 723, 732-733 (2009).),
233. Clive George & Colin Kirkpatrick, Have Sustainability Impact Assessments of Trade
Agreements Delivered on Development Issues? A Reflective Analysis of the Emergence and Main
Contributions of Trade SIAs, in TRADE, GLOBALIZATION AND SUSTAINABILITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: A
CRITICAL LOOK AT METHODS AND OUTCOMES 79 (Paul Ekins & Tancrède Voituriez eds., (2009);
Zvelc, supra note 221, at 193.
234. George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 233; Zvelc, supra note 221, at 193.
235. George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 233.
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trade policy.236 In 2010, the European Parliament underlined the
importance of ‘acting in full’ on the results of SIA, urging negotiators
to ‘take more account of the priorities and concerns that emerge from
these impact studies.’237
Assessing the influence of SIAs on trade negotiations leads to a
qualitative, almost impossible discussion. 238 Since there is no legal
provision requiring negotiators to use their findings as basis for their
policies, the incorporation of these studies in negotiations is at their
discretion.239 Trade negotiators are expected to participate actively in
the SIA process by liaising with the external consultants, briefing
them on the negotiations, and taking the results of the impact
assessments into account in establishing the European Union’s
negotiation position.240 However, they are also bound by the mandate
issued by the Council as well as hierarchical orders and decisions. As
a result, it is difficult to measure how SIAs are actually incorporated
into the policymaking process.241
Impact assessment studies are supposed to help in making better
decisions by providing more information. However, as discussed
above, the policymaking process is marked by bounded rationality.
Even if scientific studies provide accurate information that does not
guarantee that it will be fully integrated in the formation of
policies.242 Negotiators may feel overwhelmed by different sources
of information. The guidance provided by SIA studies might
therefore not be substantial.243 The first edition of the Handbook for
Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment stated that ‘[m]any
stakeholders have criticized the length and format of Trade SIA
reports. Consultants must do their utmost to provide concise reports
avoiding, for example, long lists of studies or complex descriptions in
the case studies undertaken. The main findings and recommendations
should be clearly identified.’244 Authors have also claimed that SIA
studies only establish weak links to the negotiations itself, presenting

236. Voituriez et al., supra note 163, at 335; George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 58, at 73.
237. European Parliament, Resolution of 25 November 2010 on Human Rights and Social and
Environmental Standards in International Trade Agreements, OFFICIAL J. OF THE EUR. UNION 19
(2010).
238. Alf et al., supra note 57, at 48.
239. Id.
240. Alf et al., supra note 57, at 7.
241. Id.
242. Ann-Katrin Bäcklund, Impact Assessment in the European Commission – a System with
Multiple Objectives, 12 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y. 1077, 1083 (2009).),
243. Alf et al., supra note 57, at 8.
244. European Commission, supra note 86, at 26.
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rather general discussions.245 Furthermore, there is the risk that
negotiators will cherry-pick and only read those parts they are
interested in, ignoring possible negative impacts in other areas.246
Civil society organisations have criticised the perceived failure of
impact assessment studies to prompt policy adjustments.247 This is
essentially a consequence of the role that SIAs perform. These studies
are not intended to influence policymaking directly, but rather indirectly
through the promotion of public dialogue.248 Several non-governmental
organisations have criticised this indirect, secondary role of trade SIAs:
SIAs are being conducted at arms length from policy-making,
and policy makers are not sufficiently involved in the SIA
process. There must be high-level commitment to, and
involvement in, the SIA process. Unless Commissioners, senior
officials in the Commission, Member State Ministers, and other
senior personnel are committed to and involved in the process,
SIA will remain at the periphery of policy-making and rarely go
beyond the officials managing the consultants who conduct the
research.249
From this viewpoint, the SIA process fails to allow for sufficient
consultation from non-corporate stakeholders and civil society
organisations.250 The choice of relevant stakeholders has been deemed
selective, with those consulted frequently not having the necessary
information to make their participation in an effective way.251
Furthermore, SIA studies sometimes are made public only at a late stage
of the policy implementation process, thus producing little if any
influence in the final outcome of the negotiation process.252 Finally,
some non-governmental organisations have revealed difficulties in
devoting sufficient resources to commenting on the complex and
lengthy process of SIAs, leading to a decrease in interest, attention, and
resources devoted to this mechanism.253
Civil society has been calling for measures to enhance the relevance
245. Alf et al., supra note 57, at 13.
246. Id.
247. George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 57, at 69; George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 58, at 69.
248. George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 57, at 69.
249. Joint NGO Statement on Sustainability Impact Assessment of EU Trade Policy (2002),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/122192.htm.
250. See Marc Maes, Civil Society Perspectives on EU-Asia Free Trade Agreements, 7 ASIA EUR.
J. 97 (2009).
251. Baxewanos & Raza, supra note 223, at 12.
252. Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droit de l’Homme, supra note 224, at 11.
253. Alf et al., supra note 57, at 20.
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of impact assessment studies in the formulation of trade policies.254
Greater attention should be devoted to the decision-making process
itself.255 The incorporation of the findings of SIA studies in the
negotiating process and on flanking measures outside the trade
agreement are vital for the credibility of the whole process.256 For SIAs
to serve their purpose they must be at the heart of the policy-making
process, otherwise they become little more than a ‘bureaucratic exercise
in greenwash.’257 Naturally, the lack of a clear legal framework for SIAs
weakens the value of recommendations contained in trade SIA
studies.258 Without a clear legal mandate to commence SIAs and to
ensure that their recommendations are taken into account by negotiators,
the value of this tool as an input is debatable.259 The Commission is not
bound by the recommendations and there are few legal reasons to take
them into account.260 The creation of clear legal requirements in this
regard could strengthen the relevance and effectiveness of SIAs.261
Additional improvements in terms of public participation should
also be made.262 The creation of a proper legal framework on trade
SIAs should include specific procedures for public participation.263
New mechanisms to increase transparency and consultation should be
implemented. The European Economic and Social Committee has
suggested the creation of a civil society monitoring mechanism
including actors from business, trade unions, NGOs, academia and
others.264
SIA studies are an important tool because they gather information
on the potential impact of trade agreements on diverse dimensions
and engage civil society in the discussion of that impact. They are
probably best understood as a communication tool, demonstrating to

254.
255.
256.
257.

Kirkpatrick & George, supra note 60, at 326; Kirkpatrick & George, supra note 187, at 3.
Kirkpatrick & George, supra note 57, at 129.
Zvelc, supra note 221, at 203.
Joint NGO statement on Sustainability Impact Assessments of EU Trade Policy, supra note

249.
258. Baxewanos & Raza, supra note 223, at 12.
259. Gehring, Stephenson & Cordonier Segger, supra note 58, at 188.
260. Id.
261. Id, at 187.
262. See INGMAR VON HOMEYER, MATTHEW COLLINS & WESLEY INGWERSEN, Improving Public
Participation in Sustainability Impact Assessment of Trade Agreements, in TRADE, GLOBALIZATION &
SUSTAINABILITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: A CRITICAL LOOK AT METHODS AND OUTCOMES 189-207 (Paul
Ekins & Tancrède Voituriez eds., 2009.
263. Gehring, Stephenson & Cordonier Segger, supra note 58, at 188.
264. European Economic & Social Committee, Opinion of the European Economic and Social
Committee on the Role of Civil Society in the Free Trade Agreement Between the EU and India,
OFFICIAL
J.
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EUR.
UNION
9-10,
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critics that civil society’s concerns have been taken into account in a
transparent and accountable manner.265 By conducting impact
assessment studies, the European Commission shows that it accepts
input from external stakeholders and communicates likely policy
impacts to decision-makers and the wider public.266 These studies are
used as a tool to disseminate the rationale for trade policy proposals,
inside and outside the Commission.267 Trade SIAs can therefore also
be seen as a political instrument rather than a knowledge tool.268
While the direct influence of trade impact assessment studies on the
decision-making process seems low, it can be said that they nevertheless
contribute to raising public awareness about the broader consequences
of trade policies.269 The European Commission’s system has at least the
merit of exposing the economic, social, and environmental aspects that
are implicated in trade negotiations.270 Impact assessment studies force
policymakers to collate and evaluate evidence as they make decisions
and to produce a statement to explain their options. SIAs allow for a
discussion between a broad range of stakeholders about a diversity of
issues that would not be included in a traditional trade agenda.271 They
ensure that empirical data on the diverse components of trade
policymaking is taken into account and that multiple alternatives are
contemplated.272 Even if they do not bring about more than estimations,
they allow to questions orthodox assumptions273 and might even assist in
thinking ‘outside the box.’274
Still, it should be kept in mind that the object-matter of trade SIAs
are trade policies. Assessment studies might be useful as a tool to
render policymaking processes more rational and informed – but
trade policies have a political dimension, and political questions are
always political.275 Despite its politically nonbinding character,
impact assessment studies serve as a guiding framework for the
political decision making process and to justify policy interventions.

265. Alf et al., supra note 57, at 8.
266. Bäcklund, supra note 242, at 1082.
267. Id. at 1085.
268. Id.
269. George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 58, at 69; Kirkpatrick & George, supra note 187, at 16.
270. BONANOMI, supra note 188, at 94.
271. James Harrison, Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade Agreements: Reflections on
Practice
and
Principles
for
Future
Assessments
at
16,
http://www.humanrights.ch/upload/pdf/100719_Background_paper.pdf.
272. BONANOMI, supra note 188, at 94.
273. Harrison, supra note 271, at 15.
274. BONANOMI, supra note 188, at 94.
275. Bäcklund, supra note 242, at 1084.
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276

Furthermore, one should also take into account the power of
public pressure. The public disclosure of assessment studies can
provide information to civil society groups and feed into their
advocacy work.277 If concerns are raised by civil society groups that
are refuted without proper justification, they may trigger significant
public opposition.278 The sheer existence of impact assessment
studies requires negotiators and policymakers to engage in a
discussion with the general public, contributing to change the mindset of trade negotiators.279 SIAs are now well established in European
trade and investment policymaking, and there seems to be a political
consensus to continue conducting them in the future.280 That is
already a significant, incremental step when compared with the
secretive way trade negotiations were traditionally conducted.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

For a long time, international trade and investment agreements
were based on classic theoretical assumptions on how to instigate
economic development. Trade negotiators operated assuming that
liberalisation policies would promote economic growth and that
potential negative impacts would be offset. Over the last decades a
torrent of scholarly works have suggested the existence of a gap
between empirical evidence and traditional assumptions. This gap
needs to be addressed by taking the state of the art in economics into
due account.281 The relationship between trade and investment laws
and policies and international development has frequently been
clouded by ignorance and mistrust. This looks paradoxical since the
too fields seem closely linked.’282
It is crucial to increase the knowledge of politicians, negotiators,
and policymakers on the broader impacts of trade and investment
liberalisation policies so as to ensure that they succeed in increasing
trade, attracting investment, creating jobs, and enhancing the overall
welfare of countries. The complexity of trade and investment policies
compels policymakers to look for frames of reference and evidence
276. Aranka Podhora, The Policy-relevancy of Impact Assessment Tools: Evaluating Nine Years
of European Research Funding, 31 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 85, 86 (2013).
277. Alf et al., supra note 57, at 48.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Alf et al., supra note 57, at 3.
281. Anne Van Aaken & Tobias Lehmann, Sustainable Development and International
Investment Law: a Harmonious View from Economics, in PROSPECTS IN INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y: WORLD
TRADE FORUM 338 (Roberto Echandi & Pierre Sauvé eds,(, 2013).
282. SCHILL, TAMS & HOFMANN, supra note 169, at 3.
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to support their policies.283 The current impasse in multilateral trade
negotiations, and corresponding difficulties at the regional and
bilateral level, should be perceived as an incentive for governments
to reassess the contribution of trade and investment policies to
economic and social progress, and to adjust the policymaking process
accordingly.284
Over the past decade it has become de rigueur for governments and
international organisations to underline the need for ‘evidence-based’
policy.285 There is nothing particularly novel about the idea that policy
should be based on evidence.286 Policymakers have always made use of
evidence to some extent in making decisions and in convincing others
that they are making the right choices.287 It seems intuitive that
policymakers should try to make informed evaluations about the
potential consequences of policies.288 The evidence-based policymaking
philosophy encourages policymakers to draw on scientific knowledge
when making options, seeking to replace ideologically driven politics
with more rational decision-making processes.289 Without evidence,
policymakers rely on intuition, ideology, and conventional wisdom – or,
at best, theory alone.290 Evidence-based policymaking encourages a
more rational, rigorous, and systematic evaluation of policy options.291
Still, evidence-based policymaking should not be seen as a magical
potion that will remove the stains of political and ideological
motivations from the policymaking process. Indeed, it would be naive to
believe that policymaking can be reduced to the technical evaluation of
benefits and costs of different policy options.292 While this approach
strives to provide evidence that is sound, objective, and free from
personal bias, that is seldom possible. Furthermore, methods that are
efficient in some areas might not be adequate in the more politically
chaotic world of social and economic policy.293 Finally, governments
and policymakers frequently invoke the concept of evidence-based
policymaking as a stamp of legitimacy for their decisions. While
evidence-based policymaking offers a valuable set of professional
283. TUSSIE, supra note 156, at 1.
284. Kirkpatrick & George, supra note 57, at 128.
285. BOSWELL, supra note 140, at 3.
286. Marston & Watts, supra note 29, at 145; Clarence, supra note 150, at 1.
287. MUNRO, supra note 105, at 48-49.
288. Bevir, supra note 31, at 83.
289. MUNRO, supra note 105, at 48.
290. Banks, supra note 138, at 5.
291. Id.
292. Marston & Watts, supra note 29, at 158. See also Perri Six, Can Policy Making be EvidenceBased?, 10 J. OF INTEGRATED CARE 3 (2002).
293. BURTON, supra note 45, at 8.
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practices and objectives, it is also a rhetorical tool that politicians often
use to legitimate their options.294
Evidence-based policymaking is a vague, aspirational term, instead of
an apt description of the policymaking process.295 One of the goals of
evidence-based policymaking is to ensure that, as far as possible,
policies are driven by research.296 While this is seducing in abstract, the
truth is that the simple evocation of the principle conceals a variety of
issues concerning the nature of evidence and the policymaking
process.297 There are many factors bearing on the policymaking process
besides scientific knowledge. While the evidence-based movement
seeks to raise the profile and importance of evidence in the formulation
of policies, other factors such as ideology, professional norms,
institutions, expert views, personal experience, media interest and
politics, all continue to exert substantial influence.298 In this context,
scientific knowledge is rarely situated at the centre of the debate.299
Alternative expressions such as ‘evidence-informed’, ‘evidenceinfluenced’, ‘evidence-inspired’, or ‘research-shaped’ policymaking
seem more suitable to describe the contribution that this movement can
make to the policymaking process.300
Still, the evidence-based approach to policymaking has a
significant contribution to make by promoting a more analytic
approach to decision-making processes.301 Its role is not to replace
political authority with expert knowledge but rather to reconcile
them: politics will guide and direct while expert knowledge serves
and enlightens.302 The role of evidence is to inform the policymaking
process rather than driving it.303 While policymakers often use
scientific information to support prior beliefs or disguise other
motivations, the fact is that, when the debate is based on evidence
and data, the role of science in the policymaking process is enhanced,
making more space for policy arguments to include scientific
294. Head, supra note 27, at 77.
295. CAIRNEY, supra note 28, at 1.
296. Cherney & Head, supra note 37, at 511.
297. BURTON, supra note 45, at 7.
298. MUNRO, supra note 105, at 64-65; Nutley, Walter & Davies, supra note 150, at 7; Head,
supra note 119, at 143.
299. Head, supra note 119, at 143.
300. National Research Council, supra note 129, at 14; MUNRO, supra note 105, at 48; Nutley,
Walter & Davies, supra note 150, at 7; BOGENSCHNEIDER & CORBETT, supra note 98, at 4; Cherney &
Head, supra note 37; Head, supra note 119, at 144; Huw Davies, Sandra Nutley & Peter Smith,
Introducing Evidence-based Policy and Practice in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS? EVIDENCEBASED POLI’Y & PRAC. IN PUB. SERV. 11 (Huw Davies, Sandra Nutley & Peter Smith eds., (2000).),
301. BURTON, supra note 45, at 7.
302. Heazle, Kane & Patapan, supra note 36, at 8.
303. Nutley, Walter & Davies, supra note 150, at 3.
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evidence.304 Despite the challenges that it faces, the evidence-based
policymaking movement retains its relevance and importance.305 This
approach emphasises the importance of systematic evidence to the
policymaking process and – despite the issues raised above – this
may be the best kind of process that is available.306 Efforts to
improve the quality of the evidence that is incorporated into the
decision-making process can contribute to an increase in the quality
of policies and outcomes.307
The gap between research and policymaking seems to be reducing in
the field of trade and investment.308 Empirical knowledge is playing an
increasingly important role in the longstanding debate about competing
trade policies.309 According to Botto,310 contemporary trade negotiations
are marked by a global and national debate in which ‘good procedures’
are not the only thing that matters, but also ‘good causes’. While the
former include the importance of institutional reforms and greater
transparency, the latter include a growing debate about the real-world
impacts of trade liberalisation, which leads to a greater discussion on
how to ensure not only economic growth but also greater and more
equitable distribution.311
The assessment of the economic, social, and environmental
consequences of trade policies and agreements has been the subject of
considerable public and academic interest. There is growing acceptance
of the need to evaluate trade proposals as regards their potential
consequences. This has been recently acknowledged by Carlos
Moedas312, the European Union’s Commissioner for Research, Science
and Innovation, who stated that ‘trusted scientific evidence’ is
increasingly important for politicians and the general public, and that
people will not believe in assertions like ‘trade is good’ without further
explanation.
304. National Research Council, supra note 129, at 38.
305. Ian Sanderson, Evaluation, Policy Learning and Evidence-based Policy Making, 80 PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION 1 (2002).
306. Hoornbeek, supra note 31, at 862.
307. BURTON, supra note 45, at 7.
308. TUSSIE, supra note 156, at 1.
309. Id. at 2.
310. Mercedes Botto, Introduction: The Impact of Knowledge on Trade Policy Making, in RES. &
INT’L. TRADE POL’Y. NEGOTIATIONS: KNOWLEDGE & POWER IN LATIN AMERICA 14 (Mercedes Botto
ed., 2010).
311. Id.
312. Frédéric Simon, “Don’t be Afraid of Science” EU’s Moedas tells Commission, EURACTIV
(2017),
http://www.euractiv.com/section/public-affairs/news/dont-be-afraid-of-science-eus-moedastellscommission/?utm_medium=Social&utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_source=Facebook&utm_term=Auto
feed#link_time=1486536485.
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Trade SIAs are the most sophisticated313 and comprehensive314 form
of impact assessment used by the European Commission. They are ‘at
the vanguard of holistic impact assessment tools’,315 offering the most
remarkable,316 cutting edge,317 trade policy review mechanism
worldwide, putting forward a model follow318 and marking a turning
point in international trade negotiations319. Still, several limitations and
shortcomings have been identified. Trade impact assessments are a
fairly recent instrument and one should not be afraid of adopting a
‘learning-by-doing’ approach.320 However, if the perception remains that
these studies exert little or no influence over trade policies and
outcomes, they may be seen as a mere ‘technological fix’. It is necessary
to ensure that negotiators and policymakers acknowledge the usefulness
of trade impact assessment studies as a tool that illuminates the reasons
that bring negotiations to impasse and lead some countries to resists
some trade policies.321
A way to enhance the profile and importance of trade impact
assessment would be to conduct studies on behalf of the wider
international community, rather than being commissioned by one of the
negotiating parties.322 It has been suggested that these studies be
commissioned jointly by a group of international bodies, with the World
Trade Organisation and other international bodies such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund invited to participate as
observers.323 While the findings of such studies would not be directly
binding on the World Trade Organisation, they could have enough
credibility in the public arena to influence negotiations indirectly.324
All things considered, expectations about the novel evidence-based
approach to trade and investment policymaking – evinced by the
popularisation of trade impact assessment studies – should not be
313. European Commission, supra note 86, at 7.
314. Zvelc, supra note 221, at 191.
315. Markus Gehring, Sustainability Impact Assessment of Trade Agreements in the Americas: a
Tool for Sustainable Development, CENTRE FOR INT’L SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. 12 (2010).
316. Diane Desierto, Balancing National Public Policy and Free Trade, 27 PACE INT’L. L. REV.
549, 594 (2015).
317. Don Flynn & Eleonore Kofman, Women, Trade, and Migration, 12(2) GENDER & DEV. 66,
71 (2004).
318. Patrick Reynaud, Sustainable Development and Regional Trade Agreements: Toward Better
Practices in Impact Assessments, 8 MCGILL INT’L J. OF SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 206, 232
(2013).
319. George & Kirkpatrick, supra note 97, at 27.
320. Kessler & Abaza, supra note 202, at 281-282.
321. Ekins & Voituriez, supra note 95, at 334-335.
322. Kirkpatrick & George, supra note 57, at 128.
323. Id.
324. Id.
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exaggerated. The negotiation of trade and investment policies has
always been, and will continue to be, an inherently political process. The
regular use of trade impact assessment studies should not be expected to
usher a new ‘Age of Enlightenment’ in trade policymaking, with
‘reason’ becoming the primary source of authority and legitimacy. More
modestly, this paper argues that trade impact assessment studies
contribute to an incremental ‘illumination’ of negotiation processes,
expanding the number of actors taking part in the discussion, broadening
the issues under debate beyond the conventional agenda, and possibly
offering policy options beyond the traditional toolbox.
Trade and investment liberalisation policies are not ends in
themselves – they are, possibly, means to promote economic and
social progress. Trade impact assessment studies have an
informational role to play by systematically, analytically challenging
theoretical assumptions. Still, their influence on the formulation of
policies is in the hands of negotiators and governments. Trade and
investment policies will always be a controversial topic because they
are not mere legal devices – they also have a strong political
dimension. And science cannot provide a cure for political
controversies. The use of empirical studies in the field of trade and
investment will not be a panacea, making these policies ‘fully
rational’, much less ‘perfect’. However, it should not be labelled a
sugar pill either. While the discussion of scientific evidence does not
put an end to the debate on trade liberalisation policies, at least it has
the merit of launching objective, precise questions for public debate.
And that is definitely much better than to leave the discussion in the
arena of conviction, ideology, or faith.
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